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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC 6955-80

21 October 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Robert C. Ames
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: Near East and South Asia

1. Since most of the past two meetings were devoted to Iraq and Iran we decided to review other areas of concern in Near East/South Asia to insure that we had not overlooked key developments. Although there were not many warning items per se, it was useful to have a community view on these key areas. [REDACTED]

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2. Lebanon. The fears of a large scale Israeli attack prior to the US elections have not been borne out, nor is this likely. The Israelis continue to pursue their search and destroy tactics, which are both effective and low cost. Moreover, the Phalange appears to be following a more gradual, non-confrontational approach in cementing its position in North Lebanon. The likelihood of a Phalange inspired insurrection, therefore, appears to have receded. Bashir Jumayyil, the Phalange military leader, is attempting to woo Christian parties to Phalange ranks, rather than coerce them. [REDACTED]

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3. Syria/Israel. The Israelis are nervous because of the Syrian/Soviet Friendship Treaty, Jordan's support of Iraq and the slow pace of normalization with Egypt. The present Israeli leadership is preemptive-minded and may be drawing new "red lines" to describe Israeli security concerns, but neither the Syrians nor the Jordanians are likely to do anything provocative. The Friendship Treaty is fairly standard. We will not have a good fix on the price the Syrians are willing to pay for force modernization [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] but Asad will not want to cut off his supply of hard currency completely (nor would the Soviets want this) by too blatant a Soviet presence. The Golan Annexation Bill is not likely to pass the Knesset because this would probably spell the end to the

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Camp David Process. If it does, however, Asad will still be constrained because he could not be sure of a limited Israeli response to his "limited war" to gain a negotiating position. Asad is more likely to posture and to seek international support against such an Israeli move. [REDACTED]

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4. Afghanistan. There was general agreement that the insurgency is still doing well. No area has been permanently pacified; no city is immune from insurgent attack. The Soviet sweep type operations are unlikely to be very effective against an enemy that is mobile, operates in small units and picks its own spot to fight. New Soviet tactics, or a greater force will be required to hurt the insurgency. The insurgents may start to run into arms problems, which could draw the Pakistanis in deeper, but that has not been a problem to date. [REDACTED]

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5. The Gulf and the Iran/Iraq Conflict. The possibility that Iran would strike out at the Gulf states either because of their support for Iraq or out of fear that the Islamic Revolution was in trouble appears to have cooled somewhat. The Iraqis have not bowled the Iranians over, the Gulf states have not been enthusiastic in their support of Iraq, and Iran would like to avoid superpower involvement. [REDACTED]

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6. Egypt. This was the area of discussion in which there was general agreement on concern. Sadat, with all his political acumen, is facing an increasingly difficult internal situation. Inflation and corruption are the issues, cynicism is the reaction. Adding to these problems are the continued isolation of Egypt in the Arab World, the growing discontent in the military with the results of the US arms relationship - plus increased US military presence - and a clear lack of benefits from and progress toward settlement. Sadat remains a master of surprise and resiliency, but as time goes by his options become fewer. Also, Sadat's health may not be up to the strain of tough decisions and bold moves. He may have had some sort of "cardiac event" in the past two weeks. If Sadat does not act quickly to head off a coalescence of these problems, he could be in deep political trouble. Most of his options, such as the need for funding that only the moderate Arab oil producers can provide, present him with a political price he will be loathe to pay. [REDACTED]

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